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THE ASCAP LICENSING MODEL AND
THE INTERNET: A POTENTIAL
SOLUTION TO HIGH-TECH COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT
INTRODUCTION
Since its inception in the late 1960s, the Internet has reached the
forefront of the communications world.' It has shown an unprece-
dented ability to make information available to the public with ease,
efficiency and reliability. 2 As with the growth of any new communica-
tion medium, however, copyright holders are increasingly concerned
over potential infringement of their rights.' Their fears are well
founded. The Internet allows people to infringe on copyrights easily,
while denying copyright holders any reasonable method of enforcing
their copyrights.' Current technology is so simple to use that a child is
capable of posting software, music and writings on the Internet for the
purpose of worldwide public distribution.' Copyright holders, mean-
while, face new problems enforcing their copyrights across the In-
ternet. A copyright holder may not even be able to locate infringing
parties, given the Internet's international nature. 6 Those who can
locate infringers often find that the infringers lack the financial re-
sources to make legal action worthwhile As the Internet continues to
grow, both technologically and in popularity, copyright infringement
will only increase.'
There is, however, an existing solution to this problem. The way
in which performance rights organizations regulate transmission of
I See Jonathan I. Edelstein, Anonymity and International Law Enforcement in Cyberspace, 7
FORDI1AM INTELL PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 231, 235 (1996).
2 See id. at 235-36.
5 See jayashri Srikantiah, The Response of Copyright to the Enforcement Strain of Inexpensive
Copying 7'echnology, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1634, 1617-48 (1996).
4 See id.
5 See id. at 1657.
6 See Edelstein, supra note 1, at 236-38.
7 See id. at 236; see also Ian C. Ballon, Pinning the Blame in Cyberspace: Towards a Coherent
Theory for Imposing Vicarious Copyright, Trademark and Tort Liability for Conduct Occurring Over
the Internet, 18 IIAs•INGs Comm. & ENT. L.J. 729, 735 (1996) (on-line infringers tend to be
judgment-proof as a result of being too young or poor to satisfy a judgment award).
8 See R. Carter Kirkwood, When Should Computer Owners Be Liable For Copyright Infringement
By Users?, 64 U. Cm. L. REv. 709, 710 (1997).
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music over the radio and television provides a model solution to In-
ternet copyright infringements Similar organizations could license
Internet Service Providers ("ISPs"), the companies that provide access
to the Internet for individuals, to allow their users to transmit different
types of digital information, such as music, documents, and computer
programs over the Internet. Copyright holders could regulate the
transmission of information through these licensing companies the
same way music writers and publishers use performance rights organi-
zations todayl° Once the ISPs pass the rights contained in these li-
censes to Internet users, each individual user could legally place such
copyrighted information on the Internet. Licensing companies would
then focus their energies on surveying the Internet for the licensed
information and calculate royalties according to the number of in-
stances the copyrighted works appear on the Internet." This would, in
effect, transform the Internet into a type of "narrow-cast" transmission
resource that would allow users to access information efficiently, effec-
tively and legally without appropriating economic value from copyright
holders.' 2 Each party involved would improve his or her economic
utility, while the legal system would remain true to the constitutional
policy behind copyrights—an incentive to create works for society's
betterment.
1. THE COPYRIGI-1 -1', TILE INTERNET AND COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
A. The Origins and Nature of Copyright Protection
1. Constitutional Copyright Protection
The right of copyright, as a conceptual type of "intellectual prop-
erty," came into existence through English law and the Statute of Anne
in 1710." Here in the United States, in an effort to "promote the pro-
9 Set Andrew Hartman, Don't Worry, Be Happy! Music Performance and Distribution cm the
Internet is Protected After the Digital Performance Rights in Sound Recordings Act of 1995,7 DEPAut,
LCA .I. ART & ENT. L. 37, 67 (1996).
10 See infra notes 140-59 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 170-79 and accompanying text.
12 See Niva Elkin-Koren, Cybertaw and Social Change: A Democratic Approach to Copyright Law
in Cyberspace, 14 CARouzo ARTs & ENT. L.J. 215, 262 (1996). "Narrow-casting" refers to the
selective, user defined transmission of works that occurs on the Internet, rather than broad radio
or television transmission (i.e. "broad-casting"). See id.
13 See Srikantiah, supra note 3, at .1639 & 1639 n.27. The Statute of Anne was created in
English law to enhance the public welfare by encouraging the dissemination of knowledge and
encouraging "learned men to compose and write useful books." Id.
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gress of Science and useful Arts," the founding fathers granted Con-
gress the enumerated power to give exclusive copyrights to authors,
inventors and creators.''' The Constitution grants this power to Con-
gress through Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, which is the basis of all
copyright law.' 5
The ultimate purpose of this power was to encourage the dissemi-
nation of information. Ironically, despite this policy, copyright law
allows a copyright holder to impede the spread of his or her works and
thereby stern the dissemination of knowledge." Thus, even where dis-
tributing copyrighted information would benefit society, a copyright
holder may restrict society's access to the information.'? Constitutional
drafters saw this as a necessary consequence of encouraging people to
create works—giving copyright holders the opportunity to benefit from
their works both socially and financially."
The evolution of the technology and media has magnified this
conflict between the free flow of information and the protection of a
creator's copyrights." To keep copyright law viable in the face of
developing technology, legislators and courts have extended the appli-
cation of the law to address new technological norms."
2. Statutory Rights of the Copyright Holder
To codify copyright law, Congress created the Copyright Code
("Code"), a set of statutory rules of copyright under Title 17 of the
United States Code. 2 ' Title 17 defines the duration of copyrights, and
creates causes of action for issues such as copyright infringement and
remedies." The Code also defines the subject matter and scope of
copyright, including descriptions of limitations on exclusive rights."
Congress created exceptions to the monopolistic power of copyright—
including fair use, reproduction by libraries and archives, and secon-
14 U.S. CoNs .r. art. I, § 8, cl. B.
15 Id.
'" See generally L. Ray Panctsull & Judge Stanley F. Birch, Jr., Copyright and Free Speech Rights,
4 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (1996).
17 See generally id.
IS See Fred H. Cate, The Thchnological Transformation of Copyright Law, 81 Iowa L. REv. 1395,
1396 (1996).
19 See id. at 1398.
20 See id.
21 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-121 (1994).
22 17 U.S.C. §§ 301-305 (1994), §§ 501-511 (1994).
20 17 U.S.C. §§ 102-121.
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dary transmissions—to balance the rights of the copyright holder with
society's right to benefit from the copyrighted work 24
As media's technology evolves, the copyright law must also evolve
to remain effective. 25 Each time a new method of relaying information
to the public appears, new concerns arise over a copyright holder's
rights to protect his or her works and society's right to benefit from
them.° Existing exceptions to copyrights, designed to ensure that
society benefits from the works, often conflict with new protections
created to quell copyright holders' fears of emerging technology."
Extensions of copyright law to computer programs and digital infor-
mation, such as categorizing the transmission of digital information as
public works and display, have run up against existing exceptions to
the copyright, including the doctrines of fair use and first sale. 28 Con-
gress has emphasized the constitutional purpose of copyright law in
each legislative alteration and amendment.° By changing copyright
law to reflect modern technology, however, Congress may have im-
peded the Constitution's original policy underlying copyright law—to
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts" for all."
B. The Origins and Nature of the Internet
The Historical Internet and Modern Day Cyberspace
The Internet was originally created by the Department of Defense
in 1969 as part of the Advanced Research Project Agency Network
("ARPAnet"). 81 Its original purpose was to create a computer network
system capable of maintaining complete functionality in the event that
a portion of the system became disabled (through nuclear strike,
electromagnetic pulse or a simple power interruption)." The Inter-
24 See 17 U.S.C. § 108, § 111; Cate, .supra note 18, at 1405-07.
" See Cate, supra note 18, at 1405-07 (noting past changes to copyright law in an attempt to
adapt to changing technology such as cable TV, broadcasting, recording, etc.).
26 See Srikantiah, supra note 3, at 1636-38.
27 See Cate, supra note 18, at 1397-98.
28 See id. "Fair use" refers to the copyright exception that allows copyrighted works to be used
for the purpose of criticism, comment, teaching, scholarship and research. See id. at 1406. "First
sale" refers to the doctrine that once the copyright holder has distributed copies of his or her
work, subsequent possessors of these copies may redistribute them without permission or fear of
reprisal, See id. at 1402.
29 See id. at 1440-41.
"See id. at 1397-98.
31 See Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, No Regulation, Government Regulation, or Self-Regulation:
Social Enforcement or Social Contracting for Governance in Cyberspace, 6 CosNELI.J.L. & Pus. POLY
475,488 (1997).
32 See id.; See also Kenneth I). Suzan, Tapping to the Beat of a Digital Drummer: Fine Tuning
U.S. Copyright Law for Music Distribution on the Internet, 59 ALB. L. RV/. 789,792 (1995).
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net's design assumes, therefore, that the network by which the infor-
mation travels is unreliable." If part of the network became disabled,
the remainder of the network would route itself around the disabled
areas and continue to function. Thus, there is no way to "turn oft' the
Internet so long as any systems that are part of the network are still
functioning. 34 By 1981, the Internet was a network of 300 computers."
Privatization of the Internet began in the 1980s when the National
Science Foundation ("NSF") took over the ARPAnet project, imple-
menting links with five regional supercomputers." In 1987 the NSF
contracted with a private company, Merit Network, Inc., to improve the
network's capability." In 1989, there were over 90,000 computers con-
nected to the Internet." By 1993, only eight years after it had begun,
privatization was complete and the Internet as we know it today was
up and running."
As the Internet grew in popularity and the transmitted informa-
tion diversified, government and private agencies began investigating
ways of regulating it.° The chaotic nature of Internet usage, its inher-
ent protection from users structurally disabling the network, and the
exponential growth in the Internet's popularity, however, have made
regulation difficult:" Several international organizations watch the In-
ternet today to analyze growing issues of concern, such as copyright
infringement. There are no international regulatory bodies that gov-
ern or police the Internet, however. 42 Cyberspace is, for the most part,
self-regulated by the 9.4 million computers currently comprising the
Internet.43
2. The Nature of Information Transmission Over the Internet
ARPAnet originally designed the method of transmitting digital
information over the Internet to allow for efficient and dynamic com-
munication that is not reliant on any single pathway for success." Each
" See Gibbons, sutra note 31, at 488.
94 See id. at 488-89.
95 See id. at 488.
" See id. at 490.
97 See id.
99 See Gibbons, supra note 31, at 488.
39 See id. at 490.
40 See id. at 488. Besides governmental efforts such as the Communications Decency Act,
private organizations such as the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") and the
Internet Society ("ISOC") have attempted to implement measures regulating behavior on the
Internet with limited success. See id. at 492-93.
43 See id. at 400.
42 See id. at 492-93.
49 See Gibbons, supra note 31, at 488,492.
44 See id. at 489.
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system is required to turn digital information into accessible and un-
derstandable packages that can interface with any system on the net-
work." Under the current system, the information is divided into
Internet Protocol ("IP") packets and sent through a network of com-
municating computers through a predetermined path. The computers
define the path based on the speed at which they can transmit the
packets." The system sends the information from computer to com-
puter. At each point, the information is received, copied and sent to
its next location 1'' The system, rather than the sender, controls the
information's path. Thus, the information may take what appears to
be a geographically illogical route to its destination. The route, how-
ever, is the most efficient path based on the duration of the journey at
the time of transmission. Thus, if the least busy and quickest route is
from New York to Washington to Atlanta to Dallas to Los Angeles to
Seattle to Chicago, the information will follow that route."
The user also does not control how (or if) the information is
divided into IP packets and, thus, has no knowledge as to which parts
of the transmission arc sent along different paths:* Thus, part of his
or her transmission may take one geographic route while another part
may take an entirely different route to reach the terminal destination.
Finally, intermediate servers along the information's path do not con-
trol the receipt of the information and often do not know the infor-
mation's source. 5° For this method of transmission to work properly,
each intermediate terminal must copy the information to its own
system and send the information onward to its next destination. 5 '
Consequently, copying is a necessary and uncontrollable element of
the information's transmission. 52
45 See id. at 488-89.
46 See id.
47 See Ethan Katsh, Law in a Digital World: Computer Networks and Cyberspace, 38 Vim_ L. REV.
403, 432-33 (1993).
45 See Gibbons, supra note 31, at 489.
49 See Richard S. Verrnut, File Caching on the Internet: Technical Infringement or Safeguard far
Efficient Network Operation, 4 J. INTELL, PROP. L. 273, 280-81 (1997).
50 See Gibbons, supra note 31, at 489.
51 See Rauh, supra note 47, at 432-33.
52 See Cate, .supra note 18, at 1398. See also Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g., Inc.,
939 F. Stipp. 1032, 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (refusing to find computer owners who control Internet
connected computers liable for infringing data that crosses their computers due to Internet
traffic),
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C. The Problems of Copyright Infringement Over the Internet
I. Identifying an Infringing Party
Digital transmission across Cyberspace presents copyright prob-
lems for copyright law that amplify similar problems in other previous
methods of communication." One such problem has plagued copy-
right holders since copyright's creation—locating an infringing party."
As with finding an infringing public performer of copyrighted plays or
music, identifying parties who place copyrighted photographs or docu-
ments on the Internet is extremely difficult. 55
To enforce his or her copyright, the copyright holder must find
the source of the infringing transmission of the protected works. A
copyright holder's search typically leads to an Internet Service Provider
("ISP").56 An ISP is a company or service that connects subscribing
users to the Internet, usually in exchange for subscription fees or as
part of a company or non-profit organization (e.g., educational insti-
tutions, government offices)." Each ISP contains a group of users who
subscribe to its particular system. ISP managers may be unwilling to
divulge the list of subscribers to assist in the copyright holder's inves-
tigation effort. Even if the ISP does cooperate, users are often iden-
tified only by, pseudonyms (also known as "handles"), rather than by
their true names and addresses. 56 Even where the copyright holder can
identify the user, he or she will have difficulty finding clear evidence
that the user actually transmitted the information. Often, a particular
user's account is shared with family members, friends or colleagues.
Anyone with access to the account could be the infringer. Unknown
persons can also access accounts when a careless user forgets to log off
of his or her connection to the Internet.59
This investigative process has frustrated numerous copyright hold-
ers. Accordingly, copyright lawyers have attempted to expand liability
for copyright infringement by arguing that ISPs and Bulletin Board
83 See Srikatitiah„Jupra mite 3, at 1636-38.
54 See Edelstein, supra note 1, at 294.
88 See id.
88 See Playboy, 939 F. Supp. at 1039.
87 See Harati Craig Rashes, The Impact of Telecommunication Competition and the Telecommu-
nications Act of 1996 on Internet Service Providers, 16 ltmr. ENVTL. L. & TEci r. J. 49, 57-59 (1997).
58 See Edelstein, supra note 1, at 284.
59 See Keith J. Epstein and Bill 'faucet; Enforcement of Use Limitations by Internet Service
Providers: "How to Stop that Hacker, Cracker, Spammer, Spoofer, Flamer, Bomber, "19 I IAsTmos Comm.
& ENT. LJ. 661, 681 (1997).
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System ("MS") operators are liable for infringement caused by their
users under a theory of vicarious infringement 6 0 Under this theory,
some argue that each computer owner should be responsible for in-
formation that flows through his or her machine. 61 The courts, how-
ever have found this reasoning flawed for practical reasons. 62
In 1995, in Religious Technology Center v. Netcomm On
-Line Commu-
nication Services, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California rejected the theory of vicarious infringement,
finding that vicarious liability does not apply to ISPs because they reap
little or no benefit from the information transmitted by their users.°
In Netcomm, the plaintiff informed the defendant, an ISP, that one of
its users was posting copyrighted material on the Internet through its
computers." The defendant refused to take any action to stop the
infringing user, claiming that it did not have the resources to monitor
every one of its users or every piece of information that crossed its
computers. 65 The plaintiff then sued Netcomm for vicarious infringe-
ment. 66 The court reasoned that Netcomm did not directly benefit
financially from the infringing activities of its users. 67
 The court stated
that general user fees were too indirect a benefit to impose vicarious
liability on the ISP. 68 Thus, the court concluded that finding Netcomm
vicariously liable for its users' infringements would not advance public
policy goals. 69 Rather, such liability would damage the ability of ISPs to
provide customers with inexpensive and effective Internet service, and
would "have a serious chilling effect on what some say may turn out to
be the best public forum for free speech yet devised." 7p
2. Problems with International Infringement
The international nature of Cyberspace also causes significant
problems for copyright holders. 1 ' Internet transmission has been glo-
bal since the early 1990s. 72 Information travels across international
65 See Kirkwood, supra note 8, at 729.
61 See id, at 734-35.
62 See generally Playboy, 939 F. Stapp. at 1032; Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Noconim On•Line
Communication Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
63 907 F. Supp. at 1376-77.
64 See id. at 1366.
65 See id.
66
 See id.
67 See id. at 1377.
€6 See Net 	 907 F. Supp. at 1376-77.
Gg See id.
70 Id. at 1377-78.
71 See Edelstein, supra note 1, at 293.
72 See Gibbons, supra note 31, at 490.
July 19981	 HIGH-TECII COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT	 1069
borders at fantastic speeds and volumes. U.S. copyrights generally do
not extend beyond American jurisdiction, however, unless by interna-
tional treaty." Many infringing parties, therefore, exist outside of the
jurisdictional control of U.S. copyright law." Furthermore, domestic
infringers may evade the law by operating internationally if the profita-
bility is high enough." Operating outside of American copyright juris-
diction to facilitate infringement has become less difficult as the mar-
ket for infringement has grown more profitable.76
The World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") and
other international bodies have attempted to implement international
treaties to deal with these issues. 77 Because none of these treaties
encompass every country, however, their impact is limited. Further,
different lobbying groups continue to pressure treaty organizations to
create exceptions for their own markets. If adopted, such exceptions
could render these treaties useless. 78
Courts have attempted to deal with this type of copyright infringe-
ment by enjoining international web sites from accepting subscriptions
from American patrons. 79
In 1996, in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc.,
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
enjoined an Italian magazine with an Internet service from allowing
Americans to subscribe to the Italian web site." The magazine, with
the name "PLAYMEN," was already permanently enjoined from sale in
the United States in a previous case as it violated the plaintiff's trade-
mark.8 ' In January 1996, the plaintiff discovered that the defendant
had created a web page using the name "PLAYMEN" in Italy that was
accessible by Internet users in the United States. 82 The court deter-
mined that the website was a violation of the permanent injunction
despite the fact that such a web page was not considered when the
injunction was created in 1981. 8' The court reasoned that the injunc-
"See Edelstein, supra note 1, at 293.
74 See id. at 238, 293.
73 See id. at 231-35.
76 See id. at 235-36.
"See Gibbons, supra note 31, at 492-93.
79 See Brian A. Carlson, Balancing the Digital Scales of Copyright Law, 50 SMU L. FtEv. 825,
864-66 (1997). The first WIPO treaty originally had clauses including direct arid indirect repro-
ductions of permanent or temporary works as part of the exclusive reproduction right, as well as
a clause making illegal the use of protection-defeating devices, but both clauses were removed
due to intense lobbying during the WIPO convention. See id.
79 See generally Playboy, 939 F. Stipp. at 1032.
" Id. at 1040.
SI See id. at 1034-35.
g2 See id.
" See id. at 1040.
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tion's purpose was to prevent the defendants from disseminating their
product in the United States.'" A change in technological media did
not alter the validity of that purpose." Therefore, the court decided
that the defendant needed to ensure that American Internet users
could not access its homepage."
There are very few cases where the courts have exercised this type
of power, however, as the volume of problematic homepages exceeds
judicial resources. International copyright infringement requires a glo-
bal solution that will be difficult to enforce and long in the making.
Treaties themselves are not an effective solution to this problem unless
all involved countries are signatories and adequate enforcement re-
sources exist in all such countries.° A more comprehensive solution is
required."
3. judgment-Proof Defendants and Prosecutorial Ineffectiveness
Perhaps the most significant difficulty facing copyright holders is
that individual infringers often do not have enough assets to make
legal action worthwhile." The Internet allows a single individual to
make information available to millions of users. Consequently, a single
person can catastrophically damage the marketability of a work, creat-
ing losses far beyond the value of that person's assets." Moreover, most
infringing parties are not large corporations, but rather individual
copiers. 91 Consequently, a copyright holder is often left uncompen-
sated for numerous infringements of his or her copyrights."
Perhaps because legal options are limited, many are now turning
to the Internet itself to promote awareness of the importance of pre-
serving copyrights." While improving technology is making infringe-
ment easier, it has also produced better investigative capabilities for
copyright holders to locate infringing parties. Copyright holders are
also supporting educational programs to teach proper and legal In-
ternet use. Because the Internet is geared toward greater proliferation
91 See Playboy, 939 F. Supp. at 1040.
85 See id.
88 See id.
87 See Edelstein, supra note 1, at 290-94.
88 See id.
89 See Srikantiah, supra note 3, at 1652.
9° See id,
91 See id.
92 See id,
99 See id. at 1657.
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of knowledge and technology, perhaps the best way to deal with a
problem of the Internet is using Internet technology to solve it. 94
In sum, the legal system is currently ill-equipped to deal with the
growing problem of Internet copyright infringement. Imposing the
American legal process on the global and generally unregulated In-
ternet may prove to be unworkable and insufficient. If it is infeasible
to enjoin users from placing copyrighted materials on the Internet,
perhaps a solution can be found within analogous legal arenas. The
music industry dealt with similar copyright problems with the advent
of recording technology and radio. That industry's approach to resolv-
ing copyright issues provides a model for dealing with the problem of
Internet copyright infringement.
II. THE MUSIC INDUSTRY, COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT, AND THE
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF COMPOSERS, AUTHORS AND PUBLISHERS
CASCAP")
A. Musicians and Copyright Infringement
L Statutory Rights as Applied to the Musician
Americans have traditionally viewed music as a valuable asset. Our
culture encourages the composition and performance of music in
various ways—through well-attended musical performances by devoted
and vocal audiences, as well as through public and private funding.
Copyright law has always been important to the music and cracrtain-
ment industry due to the interest in public performances Y 5 Because
exhibition is often the purpose of composing or owning rights in
music, copyright holders of musical works value the ability to control
public performance of their works. 96 Currently, copyright holders have
the legal right to control public performances, distribution and record-
ings of their work. 97 Normally, composers and songwriters want the
public to hear their music to improve their prestige and to increase
demand for their work. Thus, copyright law must balance the copyright
holders' interests in having the music performed often, their interest
in compensation for all such performances, their personal control over
all performances and distribution of their music, and the public's
94 See Srikandah, supra note 3, at 1657.
95 See Bernard Korman & 1. Fred Koenigsberg, Performing Rights in Music and Performing
Rights Societies, 238 PLI/Pat 9, 38, 41 (1986).
9'1 See id.
97 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 114-115 (1994).
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demand that their music be performed." For artists and composers,
maintaining copyright control over their music while simultaneously
exposing it to the public is a difficult balancing act. 99
2. Pre-ASCAP Copyright Control Over Music
Even before the rise of recording technology, maintaining control
over a music copyright was problematic.'" Copyright holders often
found that public performances of their music were too numerous for
the copyright holder to control personally.'°' The holder had to actu-
ally know of and have evidence of the performance. 10" Such proof often
required too much investigation.'"
The advent of the phonograph and other recording equipment
exacerbated these copyright protection problems.m Controlling public
performances of copyrighted music became nearly impossible.'" Once
an artist recorded a piece of music, courts could construe any perform-
ance of that recording as a public performance if it occurred outside
of the confines of the family household.'" On the other hand, record-
ing technology provided much bigger audiences for copyright holders
without the need for live performers.'" Once recording technology
had achieved widespread use, courts had to become more inventive—
stretching common law interpretation of copyright law to cover the
increasing loopholes.'"
The appearance and growth of the radio and television posed
further problems for the musical copyright holder.'" While copyright
holders might not have felt threatened by individual performances of
recorded material, they could not ignore radio's widespread perform-
ance of their music."° Individually, they did not have the resources to
enforce their copyrights against each radio and television station across
the country. " Copyright holders thus needed a way to centralize their
98 See infra note 110 and accompanying text.
lig See infra note 110 and accompanying text.
100 See Linda MacLeod, 735 H.R. 1195 Source Licensing: A Legislative Swan Song to the Blanket
License, 67 Oa. L. it v, 735, 738-39 (1988).
10 ' See id.
102 See id.
)05 See id.
1 °1 See Korman & Koenigsberg, supra note 95, at 46-47.
to See id.
1(16 See id. at 52.
la7 See generally id.
108 See id.
109 See Korman & Koenigsberg, supra note 95, at 41.
II° See id.
111
 Cf. infra notes 110 and 114 and accompanying text.
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resources, extend their ability to monitor the broadcast waves and
enforce their copyrights on a national level. 12 This need, in turn, paved
the way for the inception of performance rights organizations." 3
B. The Origins and History of ASCAP
1. ASCAP/BMI Creation as a Response to Infringement
In 1913, a group of copyright holders in New York City began
pooling their resources and copyrights to form a central organization
that could collectively enforce and represent their individual inter-
ests."' These holders formally established the first performance rights
society, the American Society of Composers, Authors & Publishers."'
Collectively, these organizations issued blanket performance licenses
granting the right to perform all of the music represented in each
society."' The societies then monitored the public performance of
their constituent works." 7 By tallying the number of times the works
were performed, these organizatiimis distributed royalties according to
the public demand for each copyrighted piece of music within the
license. " 8
Through this licensing system, a composer can include his or her
music in a blanket license that is sold to radio stations and other places
that wish to perform a recording of the copyrighted music."' The artist
can then collect royalties for the licensed non-dramatic perform-
ance of the music without conducting any further investigation. 120 By
centralizing investigative power through performance rights societies,
copyright holders effectively protected their copyrights.' 2 '
2. The Current Prominence and Power of Performing Rights
Societies
Although most major music: copyright holders employ licensing
societies to regulate public performances of their music, surprisingly
the licensing society industry never developed into a fully competitive
112 See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
113 See Korman & Koenigsberg, supra note 95, at 57.
114 See id. at 59.
115 See id.
116 See E. Scott Johnson, Considering the Source-Licensing Threat to Performing Rights in Music
Copyrights, 6 U. MIAMI ENT. & Spo•rs L. Rsv. 1, 10 (1989).
117 See id. at 11.
115 See id.
119 See id. at 10.
120 See Korman & Koenigsberg, supra note 95, at 72.
121 See id. at 76.
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market, Two licensing societies, ASCAP and Broadcast Music, Inc.
("BMI"), control the majority of performing licenses in the United
States. 122
 License purchasers prefer to purchase a license covering the
broadest array of works possible to maximize value.'" ASCAP and BMI
have grown to the point where competition against them in the music
licensing industry is C-ninima1. 124
 Nearly all radio stations use ASCAP
and BMI licenses. Similarly, most filmmakers, retail stores and estab-
lishments that play music for the public use them.' 25
 Most parties
involved in the process have found the effect of performance rights
organizations on the music industry beneficial.'" Radio stations are
able to play a wide variety of music for their listeners, improving their
audience and making themselves more attractive to advertisers. 127 Mu-
sicians, composers and music publishers are able to collect on the
public performance of their works efficiently, while improving their
fame and notoriety. 128
Licensing societies have become the accepted method of regulat-
ing music performance rights.'" They collect revenues well in excess
of $350 million a year, which they spend on investigative efforts, legal
representation, surveying techniques and royalties.' 3° As a result, the
performance industry has incorporated performance licensing as a
standard that protects both the rights of the copyright holder and
benefits a wide public audience.'s'
C. The Performance Rights Society Model of Licensing
1. The Copyright Holder and ASCAP
Nearly any songwriter or composer may become a member of
ASCAP. 132 ASCAP enters into an agreement with each copyright holder,
122 See Janet L. Avery, The Struggle Over Performing Rights to Music: EMI and ASCAP vs. Cable
Television, 14 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 47, 51 (1992). Together, ASCAP and BMI own 95%
of the market share for performance rights to musical compositions. See id. ASCAP alone
represents 40,000 members and over 3 million compositions. See id.
125 See Korman & Koenigsberg, supra note 95, at 57.
124 See Avery, supra note 122, at 51.
126 See id. at 51-52.
126 See Hartman, supra note 9, at 66-67.
127 See Jay L. Bergman, Digital Technology has the Music Industry Singing the Blues: Creating a
Performance Right for the Digital Transmissions of Sound Recordings, 24 Sw. U. L. REV. 351, 357-58
(1995).
126 See id.
125 See Avery, supra note 122, at 51.
13o
	
Korman & Koenigsberg, supra note 95, at 60.
151 See Bergman, supra note 127, at 357-58.
132 See Korman & Koenigsberg, supra note 95, at 60-61. Minimal standards were set for
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which allows ASCAP to act as the copyright holder's representative in
enforcing and collecting on rights included in the individual's copy-
right.'" As part of the agreement, the copyright holder grants ASCAP
the non-exclusive right to license non-dramatic performances of the
work. 131 Similarly, the contract grants ASCAP the power to bring suit
in his or her name against infringing parties, appointing ASCAP attor-
ney-in-fact in such instances. In Finally, the copyright holder must agree
to accept ASCAP's royalty distribution system.'"
After ASCAP's significant growth, some courts raised concerns
about its monopolistic power to regulate the music industry and ques-
tioned its ability to do so under antitrust law.'" In 1941, in United Stales
v. ASCAP, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York issued a consent decree in which the parties agreed, condi-
tionally, that the defendant did not violate any law.'" The consent
decree stated that ASCAP licenses did not prohibit members from
issuing their own licenses for their works, and that such licenses would
not discriminate in price between licensees similarly situated.'• Within
this consent decree, the court determined that ASCAP would not be
in violation of antitrust legislation."° This consent decree was further
amended by the same court in 1950, allowing the court to adjudicate
when the parties involved disagree as to what constitutes "reasonable
fees.""' After these key agreements, however, the courts determined
that ASCAP's operation did not violate antitrust laws." 2
In 1984, in Buffalo Broadcasting Co. v. ASCAP, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that it was not an unrea-
sonable restraint on trade for ASCAP to offer blanket licenses to local
ASCAP membership. See id. For publishers, it includes anyone engaged in the financial risk
normally involved in the publication of musical works. See id. at 61 n.94. For composers and
lyricists, it includes anyone who regularly practices that profession of writing music and shall have
not less than one work of his composition or writing regularly published. See id.
133 See id. at 62.
1S4 See id. Through this right ASCAP can include the member's music in its blanket licenses,
but the member retains the right to license the performance of his music without consulting
ASCAP. See id. Thus, the right is non-exclusive. See id. However, when the member does so he or
she receives no royalties for such performancbs from ASCAP. See id. at 6211.102.
133 See id. Should a party infringe upon the member's copyright, ASCAP will take legal action
against the infringer on behalf of the member. See id. Thus, ASCAP is the niember's "attorney-
in-fact" for issues related to copyright infringement of his or her music. See id,
136 See id.
137 See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. I, 6 (1979); Buffalo Broad. Co., Inc. v.
ASCAP, 744 F.2d 917, 920-22 (1984).
"8 United States v. ASCAP, 1940-1943 Trade Cas. (CCII) 1 56,104 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
133 See id.
140 See id,
141 See United States v. ASCAP, 1950-1951 Trade Cas. (CCII) 1 62,595 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
142 See Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 24-25; Buffalo Broad„ 744 F.2d at 933.
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TV stations, where "source licensing" was also available. 143 In 1969, the
plaintiff, along with many other broadcasting stations, purchased a
specialized blanket license for broadcasting stations in exchange for a
fee based on the station's revenue.'" Plaintiff brought this action in
1978, claiming that the existing license unfairly restrained trade and
thus violated antitrust laws. 145 The court reasoned that other licenses
were available for the plaintiffs, including single-program licenses for
the use of individual pieces of music, or source licenses from the
copyright holders themselves. 145 Accordingly, the blanket license of-
fered by ASCAP, although likely the least expensive of the available
options, was not the only available option.' 47 Therefore, the court held
that the plaintiffs failed to prove adequately that ASCAP blanket li-
censes unfairly restrain trade in violation of the Sherman Antitrust
Act.' 46
As a result of these consent decrees and other litigation, ASCAP
changed its licensing system to avoid future antitrust litigation."' The
licenses, for example, are now non-exclusive and the copyright holder
retains the right to allow any public performances that he or she wishes
without consulting ASCAP. 15° Also, ASCAP licenses do not discriminate
in license rates, terms or conditions between similarly-situated users.' 51
Royalties attached to an ASCAP agreement are determined on a com-
pletely objective basis according to a survey designed to locate public
performances of the members' works.'" Through these alterations,
ASCAP has, so far, successfully avoided antitrust liability.'"
2. The ASCAP License
Each ASCAP license is tailored to an individual industry—radio,
television and elevator music, to name a few.'" Although ASCAP is not
143 744 F.2d at 933.
144 See id. at 923.
145 See id. at 924.
146 See id. at 927.
147 See id.
148 See Buffalo Broad., 744 F.2d at 933.
149 See Korman & Koenigsberg, supra note 95, at 64-65.
159 See id. at 64.
151 See id. BMI does not act under such a restriction and thus there is no requirement that
all writers and publishers be treated alike. See id. at 65.
152 See id.
' 55 See id. Although ASCAP has been successful in combating antitrust issues through its
consent decrees, such decrees have not stopped litigants from trying their cases. See, e.g., BMI v.
CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979); BM! v. Moor-Law, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 758 (D. Del. 1981).
154 See Korman & Koenigsberg, supra note 95, at 67-68.
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allowed to discriminate in license rates or terms between similar users,
it may legally set different rates for different types of users.'" Fees arc
primarily assigned based on the value of performance music to the
individual industry. 156 Thus, radio stations may pay more than televi-
sion stations.'" The rates are also set according to the total size of the
audience. 15" For example, radio and television stations pay a licensing
fee based on a percentage of net revenues, while a bar or restaurant
pays based on objective factors such as seating capacity or whether the
establishment uses live or recorded music.'" Common provisions, how-
ever, include the right to perform all current and future works in the
ASCAP repertory for the term of the license.' The license is limited
to non-dramatic public performances." Often, ASCAP has the right
to audit the establishment to ensure compliance.'" ASCAP may also
terminate the license in cases of breach or non-payment of fees.'"
Because each license grants similar rights, some industries have
accused ASCAP of price-fixing when it charged different fee structures
to different industries." In 1979, in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
v. ASCAP, the United States Supreme Court held that this pricing
system for blanket licenses did not constitute illegal price-fixing.'" The
plaintiff purchased blanket licenses from ASCAP for the use of music
on its television station.i 6" The plaintiff later claimed that the license
unfairly bundled rights to desired music with rights to undesired mu-
sic, and thus was a form of illegal price fixing and a violation of the
Sherman Antitrust Act.' 67 The Court, however, determined that such
pricing did not violate antitrust legislation." Instead, the Court rea-
soned that the system was a function of the industry's market struc-
ture.'" Thus, the Court reasoned, given the availability of source li-
censes, the artists did not fix prices, but rather allowed the blanket
195 See id. at 64.
156 See id. at 67.
157 See id. at 67-68.
15B See id.
159 See Korman & Koenigsberg, supra note 95, at 67.
111° See id. at 68.
161 See id.
162 See id. This right is used when the license fee is dependent on information solely in the
user's possession, such as a hotel's expenditures for live entertainment. See id.
1 "3 See id.
" See Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 6.
165 Id. at 24-25.
166 See id. at 6.
167 See id.
168 See id. at 23-24.
169 See Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 23-24.
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license as an alternative purchase option. In other words, artists were
not agreeing to withhold a license to their copyrights at a cheaper
price, as would typify a price-fixing arrangcment."°
Notwithstanding the decision of the courts in Columbia Broadcast-
ing System and Buffalo Broadcasting, many licensees still criticize the
legality and fairness of the ASCAP licensing system."' In certain in-
stances, dissatisfaction with the ASCAP licensing system has led some to
seek licenses from the copyright holders themselves, known as "source
licensing." It could be argued that if source licensing becomes more
popular, it will create a broader and more competitive market for
licensing.'" Others argue, however, that source licensing is a question-
able venture in the face of cooperative licensing societies.' 74 It appears
that the difficulty in obtaining the number of individual licenses that
are already included in an ASCAP license has kept source licensing
from affecting ASCAP's monopoly.'" For those seeking licenses to only
a few pieces of music, source licensing may be more economical.'" For
most others, however, ASCAP and BMI licenses continue to be the
common source of performance licensing in the music industry.'"
3. ASCAP's Monitoring System
ASCAP is proactive in protecting its members' copyrights.'" It
identifies establishments such as nightclubs through local advertise-
ments and other sources where copyright infringements may be taking
place and provides them with opportunities to purchase licenses.'"
ASCAP informs those establishments that decline licenses of the pos-
sibility of copyright infringement liability. 18°
ASCAP sends field representatives to visit establishments within
assigned territories, locating establishments that frequently play music
publicly. 16 ' The field representatives find these locales primarily
through newspaper ads, information from competitors and word of
170 See id.
171 See McLeod, supra note 100, at 756-57.
172 See id. at 768.
1 " See generally id.
174 See id. at 768-69.
175 See generally id.
178 See McLeod, supra note 100, at 768-69.
In See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
178 See Korman & Kocniggsberg, supra note 95, at 69.
179 Ste id. at 70-71.
18° See id.
181 See id. at 69.
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mouth.'" Once located, the representatives offer it a blanket ASCAP
license for permission to play songs from the ASCAP repertory.'"
Where an establishment capitalizes on copyrighted music within the
ASCAP repertory, a field representative notifies the establishment that
it has infringed a member's rights. 184 The representative then offers
the establishment a choice between purchasing a blanket license or a
lawsuit From ASCAP.'" For the most part, these efforts have successfully
protected ASCAP members' rights.'" As a result of its investigations,
ASCAP has proceeded with thousands of lawsuits.'" Today, most estab-
lishments that offer performed music as a regular part of their opera-
tion have performance licenses from ASCAP and/or BMI.'"
4. ASCAP and the Copyright Holder
Presumably, the most important aspect of ASCAP's operation (at
least to its members) is its proccss of allocating royalties. To allocate
the appropriate royalties to each copyright holder effectively, ASCAP
surveys performances and bases its distribution on the appearance of
each piece of music.'" ASCAP studies representative samples from
every local radio and television station in the country and pays mem-
bers based on the number of times their work appeared during the
survey period. 190 Other establishments, such•as network television sta-
tions, airlines and educational licenses provide complete logs of the
music they play to ASCAP.Igt A complete piece of music is given
stronger credit for royalty assessment purposes than use of a piece of
music as part of a theme, background or "jingle."'" Once ASCAP
deducts its operating expenses from revenues, it divides the remainder
equally between writers and producers, paying royalties according to
the survey results.'" ASCAP applies the rules uniformly so that no artist
or producer is given any extra benefit because of his or her prestige
82 See id.
ISO See Korman & Koenigsberg, supra note 95, at 70-71.
184 See id. at 71.
I" See id.
L" See id.
/87 See id. at 72. Nearly all of these lawsuits arc sealed. See id. Less than 1% actually go to
trial. See id.
188 See Johnson, supra note 116, at 3; see also supra note 122 and accompanying text.
189 See Korman & Koenigsberg, supra note 95, at 72-73.
V" See id.
101 See id.
"a See id. at 74.
1°8 See id.
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or seniority within the society.'" Thus, the licensing organization treats
all members equally for purposes of allocating revenues.' 95
ASCAP has, in sum, produced an efficient and effective method
of protecting its members against copyright infringement in music
performance.I 96 It remains the industry standard in protecting the
copyrighted works of its members.'" The success of ASCAP's method
has enabled copyright holders to protect themselves significantly be-
yond what would be possible by their own individual means.' 98 These
licensing societies have overcome the significant problems of enforcing
music industry copyrights.' 99
D. The ASCAP Model Applied To Copyright Infringement Over the
Internet
I. The Copyright Holder and the Licensing Company
The successful ASCAP model provides a solution to Internet copy-
right infringement. 20' Such a model, when applied to the Internet,
would create a self-sustaining licensing system similar to licensing per-
formance music through ASCAP. 20 I
Currently, copyright holders are having a difficult time enforcing
their individual copyrights over the Internet, echoing the problems
that musical composers endured before the appearance of ASCAP and
BMI.202 Presumably then, there is a demand for collective enforcement
among copyright holders in the Internet context. If so, these copyright
holders could form licensing companies similar to ASCAP to create
licensing systems covering Internet transmission of types of informa-
tion such as music, films, literature or computer programs.'" Just as
music composers and producers of music came together to form li-
censing societies, the composers and producers of information are
searching today for a way to enforce their rights and increase the
revenues their works generate. 204 By forming licensing companies simi-
194 See Korman Sc Koenigsberg, supra note 95, at 74.
195
 See id.
19" See Bergman, supra note 127, at 357-58.
197 See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
I98 See Korman & Koenigsberg, supra note 95, at 57.
199 See id. at 56,72.
24)0 See supra notes 1-12 and accompanying text.
201 See generally Korman & Koenigsberg, supra note 95.
2°2 See Srikantiah, supra note 3, at 1647-48; McCleod, supra note 100, at 738-39.
203 see genera lly Korman & Koeniggsberg, supra note 95.
204
 See id.
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lar to ASCAP, copyright holders could use these companies for collec-
tive representation just as music composers use ASCAP. 2°5 As with
ASCAP members, representation by such an entity would grant author-
ity to license the use of different kinds of information, provide better
investigative ability, and establish a royalty system for its members
without impeding the flow of information on the Internet. 206
2. The Licensing Company and the ISP
Under this ASCAP-type system, these organizations would allow
Internet users to transmit any material in their repertory. It would be
impractical, however, to sell these licenses to individual users legally. 2°7
The number of Internet users is growing exponentially.m Conse-
quently, any attempt to control and keep records of each individual
hornepage on the Internet would be futile. 2°9 Users, however, can be
grouped together under each of their respective ISPs."'° Each ISP
provides service for hundreds or thousands of users, all of whom use
the ISPs' computers to post homepages and to transmit and receive
email messages.21 ' Thus, instead of selling licenses to individual users,
it would be more logical to sell the license to an 1SP that can represent
all of its users as a group. 212
The ISP also has incentives to represent its users. Although courts,
such as that in Religious Technology Center v. Nelcomm, have recently
been unwilling to find ISPs liable for the copyright infringements of
its users, the ISP is not without liability exposure. 2 's Logically, each 1SP
has an interest in avoiding litigation. An 1SP could see these licenses,
then, as an opportunity to reduce the possibility of an adverse judg-
ment for contributory or vicarious liability in an action for copyright
infringement. Furthermore, the market for ISPs is currently a competi-
tive one. 2 ' 4 Presenting these licenses as part of an ISP's service would
motivate users to join one ISP over another. Today, many Internet users
ignore legal consequences associated with copyright infringement, and
205
 See id.
2241 See generally id.
2" Cf. Macleod, supra note 100, at 767-768 (discussing problems with source licensing).
2" See Gibbons, supra note 31, at 492.
2" See id.
212 See Rashes, supra note 57, at 57.
2" See id. at 57-59.
212 See supra notes 185-88 and accompanying text.
2)2 See Religious Tech. Cu.• v. Netcomin On-Line Communication Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361,
1380 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
214 See Epstein, supra note 59, at 680.
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continue to violate copyright laws on the Internet with impunity. 215 As
technology improves, however, this impunity may cease to exist. As
copyright holders come together to pursue their legal rights, they
would find it much easier to identify and take action against infring-
ers."' While individual copyright holders may not find it economically
feasible to bring legal action against an individual, a larger collective
body would have the necessary resources and may be more willing to
take such action. 211 As a result, individual users will want to avoid
infringement suits. ISPs that have licensed the information that they
wish to post and transmit would likely become more marketable. Fi-
nally, as with ASCAP, as these licensing organizations cover more in-
formation, the value of these licenses will increase. 216 In turn, more
users would seek ISPs carrying such licenses. Accordingly, the ISP,
rather than any individual user, would be a good place to direct the
sale of licenses.
After the licensing organization grants a license to the ISP for a
type of digital information, the licensing organization must then allo-
cate appropriate royalties to its members. To do so, the licensing
company would survey the Internet in ways similar to how ASCAP
surveys radio stations, i.e., by obtaining and reviewing representative
samples of Internet space, analyzing these samples and paying royalties
based on the appearance of the licensed information."' This system
would require each organization to create and present a payment
system that would allow the organization to keep the licenses market-
able while providing adequate compensation for constituent members.
3. The ISP and the Subscriber
Once the ISP purchases a license from a licensing organization,
the license would cover all users who subscribe to the ISP's service and
they would have the right to post and transmit the licensed informa-
tion. For example, an ASCAP-type license would allow all ISP members
to post and transmit musical recordings on their homepages."° Having
the music data on the homepage would allow for wide exposure of the
215 See Suzanne M. Fay, Cyberspace: Stretching the Fabric of Copyright Law, 23 Ortto N.C. L.
REN. 973,988 (1997).
216 1n doing so they would be following in the footsteps of the original members of ASCAP.
See MacLeod, supra note 100, at 738-39.
217 See id.
218 See Korman & Koenigsberg, supra note 95, at 57.
219 See id. at 72-73.
22°A homepage, also known as an Internet site, is a graphical interface stored on a computer
connected to the Internet. See Playboy Enters., Inc, V. Chucklcbcrry Publ'g, Inc., 939 F.Supp. 1032,
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music, as other users could find the displayed piece of music through
a network browser. The artists and producers would benefit through
the greater notoriety of their work, while receiving royalties from the
licensing company for its appearance on the Internet. In exchange for
granting users licensing rights, the ISPs will pass along licensing fees
to users through rate increases. Internet users, through this system,
engage in a type of "narrow-casting," permitting individuals who wish
to receive specific information to receive it. 221 This is a more efficient
and effective method of finding desired information than receiving
television or radio broadcasts, as a user can locate the specific infor-
mation that he or she desires.222 Under this system, the ISP and its users
are similar to a "narrow-casting" radio station, transmitting licensed
information across the Internet legally and for the greater benefit of
informing society. Concomitantly, the fame and notoriety of the infor-
mation would heighten through "public performance" of the music,
films, and other works that users post. In short, this approach furthers
the purpose of the Internet—to transmit information efficiently and
effectively. 223
E. Privatized Market for Licensing—a Model for "Narrow-Cast"
Transmission
1. "Narrow-Casting" versus Broadcasting
The Internet is a communication medium. It does not generate
information, nor does it alter the display or performance of that
information.224 It is simply the space and memory of numerous com-
puters linked together to function as one huge memory landscape,
with each piece of memory space controlled by an individual ma-
chine.225 Although one system or another may experience difficulty at
any given Lime, it is nearly impossible for the entire network to fail. 226
There is no central control, and each individual's ability to receive
information is based on the operation of their local systern. 221
1035, n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). It is accessed with proper software through a computer connected to
the Internet, and is located through au Internet address, also known as a Uniform Resource
Locator ("URL"). See id. If the Internet user knows the proper address, they can access the
homepage and download the contents to the screen of his or her personal computer. See id.
221 See Gibbons, supra note 31, at 479.
222 See id.
223 See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
224 See supra notes 31-43 and accompanying text.
223 See Gibbons, supra note 31, at 492.
226 See id. at 488-89.
227 See id.
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As a form of communication, the Internet is much more efficient
and advanced than the radio, transmitting information directly to the
users who desire it, rather than broadly across public airwaves.'" But
the actual effect of transmissions between sender and recipient, (i.e.,
"narrow-casting ") is no different from any radio or television broadcast.
The difference lies in the fact that the Internet user has the advantage
of accessing the information upon demand, rather than by a fixed
schedule, thereby allowing the user to have constant access to the
information at convenient times. 229 Nonetheless, the law should regu-
late the Internet the way it regulates a broadcast system.
Public performance or display of any copyrighted work, be it
music, documents, literature or computer programs, is difficult to
control. 2" Licensing societies have produced an effective.and efficient
system of regulating the public performance of copyrighted music
through radio, television, film and other media. 231 There is no reason
why a similar system would not apply to the Internet. 292
2. A Potential Market for Private Licensers
This system of ASCAP-style licensing brings value to every party
involved. 2" Copyright holders will receive financial benefit for the
public performance of their works. At the same time, licensing com-
panies would profit from the creation and sale of licenses to ISPs.
Given the ever-increasing demand for Internet access, this market is
only likely to become larger and more profitable in the future. ISPs
would better control their liability exposure and become more market-
able by offering these licenses to their users. Finally, the users them-
selves would benefit from the ability to post and transmit copyrighted
information over the Internet legally. As all parties benefit, this system
will likely be self-sustaining.
New licensing societies could group together new types of infor-
mation based on demand. Because each society would be responsible
for its own surveying of the Internet, economic incentives would create
efficient licensing companies with strong surveying abilities and fair
royalties policies for its members. The growth of the licensing industry
will improve the policing power of the copyright holders, making these
223 See id. at 479.
229 See id.
230
	 Srikantiah, supra note 3, at 1647-48.
231 See Korman & Koenigsberg, supra note 95, at 74.
"2 See id.
233 See Hartman, supra note 9, at 66-67.
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licenses more attractive to users in the face of undesirable litigation.
The result of this demand will spur ISPs to seek out these types of
licenses for their users. In the end, the Internet will reach its potential
as a powerful tool to transmit works directly upon demand while
protecting the rights of copyright holders.
CONCLUSION
Performance rights societies such as ASCAP and BMI provide a
model for licensing organizations geared toward all types of works.
Such a licensing system would empower disenfranchised copyright
holders, as well as accommodate the demands of Internet users. By
improving the economic utility to all parties, this model of perform-
ance licensing would improve the current situation, which has para-
lyzed copyright holders and produced inconclusive litigation on issues
of copyright infringement over the Internet. Not only would all parties
benefit, but this system would preserve the purpose of the copyright—
to promote creation and invention—by rewarding originators of works
with the monetary rewards, the fame and the recognition that they
deserve for their contributions.
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